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LIST OF ABBREVIATONS 
 
AKP Justice and Development Party (Turkey) 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
EC European Council 
ECRE European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EEC European Economic Community 
EP European Parliament 
EUChFR EU Charter on Fundamental Rights 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
LGBTIQ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer 
MPSG Membership of a Particular Social Group 
MS Member States 
RSD Refugee Status Determination 
SOGI Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Identity 
SCO Safe Country of Origin 
STC Safe Third Country 
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNHRC UN Human Rights Council 
 
  
 
2 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
“In its struggle to maintain control of its 
borders […] [Europe] is being tested on its 
adherence to human rights.” 
- François Crépeau [UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Migrants] 
On March 18th, 2016, during the European summit, the European Council 
signed a Statement with Turkey (hereafter ‘Statement’), enacting a tool designed 
to ‘end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU’.1 The measure established 
that all new irregular migrants ‘not in need of international protection’ crossing 
from Turkey to Greece would be returned to Turkey. Equally, a ‘one for one’ 
resettlement scheme was established, resettling one Syrian from Turkey into the 
EU for every Syrian that is returned from Greece to Turkey. The mechanism 
hinges on two conditions of the ‘recast’ Asylum Procedures Directive:2 the first 
country of asylum rule (Article 35) and the the inclusion of Turkey in the list of 
safe third countries (STC; Article 38). 
Accordingly, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) raised 
concerns about returns of asylum-seekers to Turkey without prior individual 
assessments, since this would amount to illegal pushbacks,3 as defined by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Hirsi Jamaa. The ECtHR found that, 
where a Contracting State had returned asylum-seekers without giving them prior 
access to legal remedies (e.g. applying for international protection), this would 
amount to a collective expulsion (i.e. illegal pushbacks). Furthermore, jurisdiction 
exercised extraterritorially would constitute no obstacle to its classification as 
such (e.g. in Turkish waters).4 Forcibly returning asylum-seekers to Turkey would 
then already be unlawful if done collectively, with their lack of access to legal 
remedies constituting refoulement, unless Turkey were considered a STC.5 It is 
around this classification and the Commission’s proposal for Turkey to be 
                                               
1 European Council, 2016; For a better understanding the origins of this plan, conceived by the 
ESI in 2015 and then proposed by Dutch Labour leader Diederik Samson, cf. Roman, Baird, & 
Radcliffe, 2016: 10. 
2 Directive 2013/32/EU, ‘recast’ Asylum Procedures Directive. 
3 ECRE, 2016b. 
4 Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, 2012: §179. 
5 Carrera & Guild, 2016. 
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included in the ‘safe countries of origin’ (SCO) list that the academic/institutional 
debate focused. 
The Asylum Procedures Directive provides that a person seeking 
international protection must, inter alia, 1) not be threatened on account of “race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group (MPSG) or political 
opinion”, 2) not be at risk of serious harm, 3) be protected from refoulement and 
4) be allowed to request refugee status in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention.6 Therefore, Turkey’s consideration as a STC and SCO already 
problematises the level of human rights protection granted to asylum-seekers 
there. Albeit explicitly stating that collective expulsion would be excluded and that 
the principle of non-refoulement would be respected, the Statement remains 
contentious for several reasons.  
Firstly, classifying a country as a SCO triggers the acceleration of asylum 
procedures. The European Parliament (EP) endorsed this by proposing, in the 
amendments to the ‘recast’ Asylum Procedures Directive, that acceleration of 
asylum procedures makes it “faster for Member States to focus on giving 
international protection to those who need it most”.7 However, this shifts the 
burden of proof to the asylum-seeker.8 AIDA’s report on SCOs claims that this 
burden is frequently hard to overcome since it requires experienced legal 
assistance in constricted time limits,9 and the European Asylum Support Office 
(EASO) critically reports that 89,9% of all accelerated claims in 2014 were 
denied.10 Furthermore, scholarship shows that this concept is susceptible to 
political manipulation, whereby states may be tempted to include their allies as 
partners.11 The Commission also noted in its amendments that classifying Turkey 
as a SCO must be cautiously carried out, paying due attention to individual 
                                               
6 Respectably, articles 38(1)(a, b, c and e) of the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
7 European Parliament, 2016a: 7. 
8 Accelerating procedures rushes asylum-seekers to disclose the real motive of their flight. It is 
often common for LGBTIQs to not disclose these motives initially, because of internalised 
stigma and shame and due to being unaware that they might constitute a ground for protection. 
This results in ‘late disclosure’. 
9 AIDA apud Roman, Baird, & Radcliffe, 2016: 3. 
10 EASO, 2015: 96. 
11 van Hear & Crisp, 1998: 14. 
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assessments and conduct of personal interviews, on account of the reported 
violations of freedom of expression in Turkey.12 
Secondly, classifying Turkey as a STC might appear logical, given its 
asylum success rate of 23,1%, a notable difference to other countries on this 
list.13 This allows the fostering of international burden-sharing through avoiding 
multiple asylum applications and ‘forum shopping’. However, politicising such a 
humanitarian procedure through its use as a negotiation tool in the Turkish 
accession talks14 creates a liability for the EU and the potential corrosion of its 
human rights commitment. Factually, criticisms were voiced concerning Turkey’s 
non-entrée policies (going to the extent of building a wall across a third of its 
Syrian border),15 refoulements of asylum-seekers (Amnesty International 
reported almost-daily push-backs of 100 people each between January-April 
2016)16 and violence vis-à-vis Syrian asylum-seekers at the Turkish-Syrian 
border.17 It appears unlikely that such a rapid procedure would allow a case-by-
case examination of individual circumstances and that the (already 
overburdened) Greek authorities would adequately enforce the mechanism. 
Furthermore, UN claims of refoulements committed by the Greek authorities18 
and NATO’s deployment of forces in the Aegean Sea, alongside the German 
Defence Minister’s claims that NATO members had pledged to enforce 
pushbacks to Turkey, raise ethical concerns.19 Arguably, instead of improving the 
protection of refugees, the EU managed to incentivise the opposite, penalising 
Syrians who attempt to get into the EU while privileging those who do not.20 
Most crucially, despite ratifying the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, Turkey retains a geographical limitation that exempts it from applying 
the Convention to non-European asylum-seekers, originating a de facto 
impossibility for non-Europeans to request refugee status in Turkey. How, 
                                               
12 European Parliament, 2016a: 46. 
13 Cf. Roman, Baird, & Radcliffe, 2016: 5, where the lowest and highest success rates of other 
SCOs are Macedonia (0,9%) and Albania (7,8%). 
14 Cf. id.: 9, where it states that the EU committed to accelerate negotiations for Turkish nationals’ 
Visa liberalisation and to re-activate the process for Turkish accession. 
15 Dutch Council for Refugees/ECRE, 2016 (14); Nielsen, 2016. 
16 AIDA, 2015; Amnesty International, 2016. 
17 HRW, 2015. 
18 Kingsley, 2016. 
19 CNN, 2016; NATO, 2016. 
20 Carrera & Guild, 2016. 
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therefore, can a Syrian, Afghan or Iraqi asylum-seeker in Turkey legally get 
asylum when the Geneva Convention is applied only to European asylum-
seekers? Moreover, albeit being a signatory of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), the ECtHR has filed several cases pertaining to “violation 
of the prohibition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment 
including but not limited to its treatment of refugees.”21 Factually, Turkish cases 
at the ECtHR amount to 18% of all cases between 1959 and 2015, surpassing all 
other State parties22 and hinting at Turkey’s level of protection of human rights.  
Despite mentioning minorities such as children, the Statement fails 
however to address the issue of sexual minorities. Persecution targeting them is 
an ongoing reality and LGBTIQs are victims of persistent and incited violence.23 
This is highly relevant due to the discrimination, harassment and sexual violence 
often perpetrated by other refugees in camp settings due to SOGI.24 Increases in 
hate speech vis-à-vis LGBTIQs in Turkey, the cancellation of the 13th Istanbul 
Pride (alongside police attacks on the marchers with plastic bullets and tear gas) 
and the lack of any mention to SOGI in the Turkish ‘Human Rights and Equality 
Law’ further marginalise this minority,25 undermining a priori Turkey’s purported 
safety and further victimising the already threatened LGBTIQ asylum-seekers.  
This situation generates such questions as: are the political benefits of this 
Statement not outweighing the moral values the Union stands for? Is the creation 
of legal conundrums vis-à-vis migration not creating ethical dilemmas? Owing to 
the above-mentioned dangers of refoulements and push-backs, questioning the 
validity of such a policy is undeniably needed, particularly concerning sexual 
minorities. 
ECRE’s Secretary-General, Catherine Wollard, claimed that “Europe has 
the normative power to significantly improve the [refugee] situation”26 and 
François Crépeau stated that “Europe must reclaim its role as a moral and 
political leader of human rights” (my emphases).27 The issue of Europe’s 
                                               
21 ibid. 
22 Reppell apud Roman, Baird, & Radcliffe, 2016: 19. 
23 UN News Service, 2015. 
24 ORAM, 2016; ILGA, 2016. 
25 Kaos GL et al., 2016. 
26 ECRE, 2016a. 
27 Crépeau, 2016. 
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normative and/or moral/ethical power is therefore what will be analysed in relation 
to migration.  
“How does a queer reading of the EU-Turkey Statement contribute to 
empirical understandings of ‘Ethical Power Europe’?” In order to answer this 
question, this paper is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2 concerns the literature review and methodological framework. 
A démarche généalogique through the scholarship of Europe’s power introduces 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) and Ethical Power Europe (EPE), thereby 
stressing the notion of European cosmopolitan/universal ethics. To contextualise 
the importance of LGBTIQs, one sub-section locates sexuality/ies within 
International Relations (IR), followed by a section on how Queer International 
Relations (Queer IR) might provide a critical and versatile explanatory power to 
understand queer identities in IR through the application of ‘queer logoi of 
statecraft’.  
Chapter 3 conceptualises universal ethics and the universal human, 
drawing on Pin-Fat’s grammatical readings of ‘universality’ through Morgenthau, 
Beitz and Wallzer. It then follows a legal analysis to expound how respect for 
SOGI as fundamental characteristics of human beings can be found in ‘European 
universal ethics’. 
Chapter 4 illustrates conundrums in foreign policy. Through a Foucauldian 
analysis, it briefly addresses the absence of SOGI considerations in the EU-
Turkey Statement. 
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a case study on Turkey, where Turkish 
scholarship is prominently used. It addresses Turkey’s 
communitarian/cosmopolitan foreign policy divide, followed by an analysis of the 
‘conservative democracy’ ideology of the ruling Justice and Development Party 
(AKP). Posteriorly, it deploys Weber’s figurations of the ‘underdeveloped’, 
‘undevelopable’ and ‘unwanted im/migrant’ to queer the migration issue vis-à-vis 
the Turkish context. It concludes by presenting an analysis of refugee status 
determination challenges and living conditions in Turkey for LGBTIQs, illustrating 
why Turkey is not a safe haven. 
This structure approaches the research question from the abstract 
(universal ethics) to the concrete (challenges for LGBTIQs refugees in Turkey), 
constituting linchpins that serve as stepping stones towards an empirical 
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application of EPE to a particular foreign policy deal (the Statement). Apart from 
contributing to Queer IR, this research also contributes to research agendas of 
EPE through an innovative perspective that underscores the importance of 
sexualities to IR. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The nature of the EC/EU’s power qua international actor 
“The idea of a role as the basis of any foreign 
policy has severe limitations.” 
- Christopher Hill 
The scholarship surrounding the nature of Europe’s power (or its foreign 
policy role) has been ongoing for decades. Having started in the 1970s, it has 
been a critical point of departure towards analysing the then-EC/now-EU. 
Duchêne made one of the first claims, arguing that Western countries had 
developed highly pluralistic societies based on civilian values and that, in a Cold 
War context, it was necessary for major powers to be global and to think of 
worldwide impact.28 Claiming that Europe exerted civilian forms of power,29 he 
contested its ability to become a military power. Conversely, Bull argued against 
this notion, recognising that power politics were becoming increasingly irrelevant 
and that, as Keohane and Nye were already arguing during the 1980s, there was 
a “declining role of force and the growing importance of economic 
interdependence”.30 Critically, he signalled the fragility of the EC qua civilian actor 
by arguing that the neo-mercantilist canon that ‘possessing scarce resources 
translated into power’ only materialised in the absence of military opposition by 
strong states.31 Categorically rejecting the EC’s ‘actorness’ in international affairs 
and its potential to have one, he devised a realist critique advocating for Europe’s 
militarisation to counter both its free-riding on NATO and its politics of 
withdrawal.32 The recognition of Europe’s international power thus hinged on its 
‘actorness’ qua military actor, originating a seductiveness vis-à-vis adopting the 
notion of a ‘military power Europe’.33 
Twenty years later, Manners coined Normative Power Europe (NPE) as a 
result of the EU’s role in promoting norms, arguably displacing the nation-state 
as the main locus of concern. Not breaking the theoretical military/civilian 
                                               
28 Duchêne, 1972: 35-36. 
29 id.: 47. 
30 Bull, 1982: 149. 
31 id.: 151. 
32 id.: 156. 
33 Manners, 2002: 235. 
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dichotomy per se, he postulated the notion of a normative power, a transversal 
axis along which agency of military and/or civilian nature could be performed. 
Civilian power had been defined by its centrality of economic power, primacy of 
diplomatic co-operation to solve international disputes and willingness to use 
legally-binding supranational institutions to achieve international progress.34 
Manners identified similarities between Duchêne and Bull: their interest in 
maintaining the status quo Westphalian nation-state, their emphasis on direct 
power and their prioritisation of European interests. Reflexively, it had been the 
collapse of norms and ideas rather than the use of force that had instigated the 
end of the Cold-War. Drawing on Galtung’s ‘ideological power’, he questioned 
civilian and/or military power through the focus on an “ideational nature 
characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian 
conventions.” 35 NPE was backed through an identification of characteristics in 
the EU: ontological (being a changer of norms), positivist (the reality that it 
changes them) and normative (that it should act to extend its norms to the 
international system). Summarily, the EU’s capacity to define what was ‘normal’ 
in IR constituted its most important power.36 
This generated a bipartite debate between Manners and Hyde-Price, with 
the latter offering a structural realist critique that discarded Manners’ purported 
liberal-idealist reductionism, since he rejected the ‘actorness’ of the EU.37 For 
him, the historical progression that drove mainly economic integration (e.g. 
ECSC, EEC), as opposed to projects influenced by liberal-idealist notions (e.g. 
Locarno Treaty, League of Nations), evidenced the existence of structures of 
power that reified the realist doctrine in IR.38 Hyde-Price suggest that the EU was 
an instrument of collective hegemony perpetrated by a “civilising power” which 
lacked real power in the absence of militarisation.  
Counter-arguing that militarisation does not necessarily equate with 
normative power decrease, Manners emphasized the EU’s normative political 
ethos. Critical reflexivity of what the EU signified, rather than the pursuit of ‘great 
                                               
34 Twichett & Maull apud Manners, 2002: 236. 
35 Manners, 2002: 238-239. 
36 id.: 252-253. 
37 Hyde-Price, 2006: 220. 
38 id.: 224. 
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power’ status, is one of NPE’s core concerns.39 This is based on a lack of physical 
force for norm implementation, which galvanises an ontological analysis of the 
EU, stressing what it is, rather than what it does. This conceptual shift originated 
further elaborations of the nature of Europe’s international power.  
In 2008, the Journal of International Affairs released an issue that 
presented scholarship which theorised ‘Ethical Power Europe’ (EPE) from realist 
to idealist perspectives, with Aggestam introducing the edition by presenting a 
research agenda that focused on the scope of ethical considerations in 
international politics. The EPE claim pertained to the EU’s role in articulating a 
discourse of universal ethics that characterised it as a ‘power for good’ and a 
proactive galvaniser in the direction of “its own vision of the ‘global common 
good’”.40 Aggestam addressed the need to theorise about the justifications behind 
the exercise of different kinds of power. EPE therefore reversed the argument of 
normalisation of international politics by NPE (the domestication of IR by the EU) 
through the suggestion of normativity as a means to legitimise the EU’s role (e.g. 
through a focus on human rights and humanitarian intervention). Positioning the 
discourse between a cosmopolitan/universalist or communitarian view, she 
proceeded to theorise the question by contrasting ethics’ focus on empathy and 
power/interest’s self-centric focus. The discussion concerned the EU as a 
transformative power in the quest for control, or even a responsible power at 
which criticisms of hypocrisy could be levelled.41 Critically, reflexivity is the bridge 
between NPE and EPE, with the latter reminding the first of the responsibilities 
that come with the ‘normalisation’ of IR. 
The cosmopolitan/realist dichotomy emerges in Dunne’s account of a 
middle ground between the two (a ‘good international citizenship’), for which he 
discussed the EU’s collective agency in a political and moral sense.42 The first, 
derived from decision-making capabilities, would align with the latter, derived 
from the existence of a holistic European identity accruing more than the sum of 
its parts. Such a ‘good international citizenship’ would therefore affirm the 
obligation of states to regard purposes beyond themselves, but its projection 
                                               
39 Manners, 2006: 187. 
40 Aggestam, 2008: 1-2. 
41 id.: 8-10. 
42 Dunne, 2008: 19. 
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often depends on the internal negotiation of normative orders and the EU’s 
capacity to speak with one voice (which Smith claims seldom happens, on 
account of different national interests43). This generates agreements on the 
lowest common denominator, often resulting in defaulting from pre-
commitments.44 
This relates to Hyde-Price’s realist argument that ethical statecraft is often 
constrained by the ‘strategic selectivity of structures’. Some states may pursue 
ideological agendas, but he identifies antinomies in states which claim to ‘do good 
for others’ while pursuing national interests. These conceptions of normative 
and/or ethical power rest upon assumptions vis-à-vis the existence of 
cosmopolitan values which, as a realist, he discards. Signalling the way in which 
hegemons have avowed themselves of universalist claims to serve their interests, 
and hinting at the EU’s role qua ethical power, he invokes Carr’s claim of 
‘ingenious moral devices for privileged groups to maintain their dominant 
position’45 and their tendency to often degenerate into a crusading moralism. The 
contention is on the existence of a putative cosmopolitan universalism in a world 
poised with discrete political communities.46 
Conversely, Manners identified the difference between stating that the EU 
is a normative(ly ethical) actor and that it acts in a normative(ly ethical) way. The 
ontology/agency divide can only be illustrated by a focus on value ethics (‘living 
by [consistent] example’), deontological ethics (‘being reasonable in world 
politics’) and consequentialist ethics (‘doing least harm’).47 Manners argues 
through a developmental teleology to EPE that will gradually be established 
through the change from Westphalian self-regarding to post-Westphalian other-
regarding states.48  
Revealingly, the scholarship on Europe’s power often seems exclusionary, 
emphasizing dichotomies such as civilian/military, normative/coercive and 
cosmopolitan/national interest-oriented, alongside being focused largely on 
drawing ontological accounts of the EU rather than epistemological ones. To 
                                               
43 Smith, 2006: 134, concerning the EU’s participation in the UN human rights system. 
44 Dunne, 2008: 22. 
45 Carr apud Hyde-Price, 2008: 34. 
46 Hyde-Price, 2008: 32-34. 
47 Manners, 2008. 
48 id.: 60. 
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mitigate this, Nunes elaborated on each power’s (civilian, normative, ethical) 
defining features and caveats, researching also their practical application. 
Tellingly, she found that, when considered separately, these powers fail to 
provide a consistent picture of the EU’s international ‘actorness’49 and that the 
normative and ethical dimensions were more visible than the civilian one. 
EPE arises then from a belief that EU values and norms have a 
cosmopolitan moral validity and that the practices it drives focus on the rights of 
individuals rather than those of states. Going beyond the aspiration of a civilian 
or normative power, EPE develops an approach geared towards policy 
behaviour, thereby shifting the focus from the power of norms to the EU’s ethical 
considerations in foreign policy. 
Indeed, Aggestam posed EPE as a “theoretical and empirical question to 
be explored rather than a political statement of reality”50 and Nunes claimed that 
academic discussion on European identity must shift from ontological accounts 
to empirical research agendas. This paper responds to both their claims, 
empirically applying EPE to one foreign policy deal and addressing the observed 
capability-expectations gap51 in the EU’s purportedly ethical role. 
 
2.2. Locating sexuality/ies within IR 
In 2013, the European Journal of International Relations dedicated a 
special issue to ‘The End of IR’. In it, Tickner corroborated the previously-
mentioned argument that reflexivity is crucial for IR. For him, the ‘authoritative 
knowledge’ of world politics has often reduced IR scholarship to the iteration of 
reified norms under a core/periphery dichotomy. Reducing what is thematically 
different to a level of inferior knowledge, IR scholars have consistently and 
parochially limited IR’s theorisation by scholars who do not conform to the core 
ideas and its basic unit: the state.52 Critically, there is a need both to exit the box 
of Disciplinary IR and to obliterate boxes altogether, moving beyond them. 
Dunne, Hansen and Wight further corroborated this by arguing that IR undergoes, 
like all academic disciplines, processes of stasis and change, illustrating the need 
                                               
49 Nunes, 2010: 8-10. 
50 Aggestam, 2008: 9. 
51 Hill, 1993. 
52 Tickner, 2013: 634-638. 
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for ‘integrative pluralism’. In order to understand and change international 
relations, IR must bridge the disciplinary frontiers that achieve quasi-hegemonic 
status, re-evaluate accepted norms and reject scepticism towards theoretical 
diversity.53 IR’s cognisance of what is relevant in adjacent fields can prevent the 
artificially-produced borders from morphing into policing gatekeepers that screen 
which theories can contribute to it. Where does the ‘international’ begin and 
end?54 
The call towards an interdisciplinary reflexivity and integrative pluralism 
legitimises the project undertaken here: a positioning of sexuality/ies in, and a 
merger of Queer Theory with, IR. Understandably, ‘sexuality politics’ start with 
the ‘personal/private’ analytical referent, contrary to IR’s proclivity to eschewing 
it in favour of the ‘public’. Bosia argues that IR is ill-equipped to theorise how 
sexual politics influence it, due to its proclivity to universalise parochial insights.55 
However, the international politicisation of sexuality56 allows for such a 
theorisation in the realm of IR. 
Weber already pointed out Disciplinary IR’s parochialism when addressing 
the deceiving ‘absence’ of Queer International Theory. Often, queer scholarship 
within IR is seen as rejecting ‘IR’s disciplinary maps of success and failure’ and 
is consequently unacknowledged. However, that speaks more to Disciplinary IR 
as being “ill-equipped to deliver on its claim to produce knowledge about 
international politics”57 than Queer Theory’s capacity to theorise (sexualised) 
relations that shape the ‘international’.  
Broadly put, sexuality/ies matter for IR and, to this end, Queer IR allows 
one to theorise how and in which instances. The importance of sexualities for IR 
is thus a cornerstone for this project. Whereas one could claim that both are 
immiscible, it is counter-arguable that issues like sovereignty and power (deeply 
pervasive in Disciplinary IR), not only exert their influence in the sphere of 
national relations (due to the deployment of nationally-constructed ‘normal’ 
sexualities and the expectations deriving from such (re)production), but also 
                                               
53 Dunne, Hansen & Wight, 2013: 414. 
54 id.: 420. 
55 Bosia apud Picq & Thiel, 2015: 10. 
56 E.g. the 2013 Russian Anti-Propaganda law, the 2016 appointment of a UN International Expert 
in SOGI and Hillary Clinton’s statement that ‘gay rights are human rights’. 
57 Weber, 2015: 46. 
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personal (by the manifestation of societal expectations and norms constricting 
sexuality, often through harsh cis-sexist-homo-and-transphobic socialisation 
processes that alienate the all-too-often ‘sexual outsider seen-as-queer’) and 
international relations (how states present themselves internationally through 
their defence [or lack thereof] of sexual diversity). It is thus sexuality/ies’ relation 
to power and sovereignty, normalisation and imposition, that is vital in 
understanding their role and influence in IR. 
 
2.3. Introducing Queer IR 
With ‘The History of Sexuality’, Foucault attempted to transcribe into 
history the fable of ‘Les Bijoux Indiscrets’.58 Having theorised how the ‘will to 
knowledge’ and power relations are always present in discourses about sexuality, 
he inspired scholarship later focused on the production and deployment of 
sexualised subjectivities. Weber argues that many IR scholars have failed to 
theorise how such sexualities legitimise/allow international games of power and 
how ‘sovereignties’ are similarly deployed to produce identities that authorise 
national and international orders. In her book, “Queer International Relations”, 
she problematises IR’s need for Queer theory and vice-versa.59 
Despite the lack of agreement on what queer signifies, Sedgwick provides 
an explanatory avowal, stating that it is “the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, 
overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when 
the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality aren’t made 
(or can’t be made) to signify monolithically.”60 Queer studies qua academic 
practice then seek “ ‘to rethink the sexual in new ways, elsewhere and otherwise’ 
in relation to but also beyond traditional Gay and Lesbian Studies, Feminist and 
Gender Studies, and Poststructuralist Studies”.61 Highlighting the instability of 
“taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations”,62 such an application 
to IR derives meaning from the politicisation of queer subjectivities that signify 
more than one sex, gender and/or sexuality, often simultaneously (i.e. non-
                                               
58 Foucault, 1976: 77. 
59 Weber, 2016: 2. 
60 id.: 202. 
61 De Lauretis, Rubin and Butler apud Weber, 2014: 596. 
62 Nash & Browne apud Picq & Thiel, 2015: 8. 
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monolithically). In so doing, such queer subjectivities exceed traditional binary 
either/or logics (e.g. man/woman, gay/straight), rather making more sense when 
read under Barthes’ pluralised and/or logics, meaning to signify “either one thing 
or another (or yet another), while simultaneously signifying as one thing and 
another (and yet another).”63 To posit sexuality/ies (with)in IR, Weber allies the 
Queer to IR by pinning (transnational/global) queer studies to (queer) IR in 
dialectics surrounding sexuality/ies and sovereignty, theorising how the 
deployment of queer is done in relation to normative and/or perverse 
understandings of sex, gender and sexualities. Queer logoi of statecraft are thus 
deployed to ‘confirm, contest and extend the understandings of how the will to 
knowledge about sexualised sovereign subjectivities functions in domestic and 
international games of power.’64 
This paper will follow Weber’s theoretical and methodological approach, 
drawing on queer and feminist theories, alongside poststructuralist and IR 
studies. Specifically, Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality, is used to extract the 
three specific elements of analysis (power/knowledge/pleasure). These are used 
in combination with feminist technoscience studies scholar Donna Haraway’s 
concept of ‘figuration’ (as a “distillation of shared meanings in forms or images”), 
queer theory scholar Judith Butler’s ‘theory of performativity’ and poststructuralist 
IR scholar Richard Ashley’s theorisation of ‘statecraft as mancraft’.65 Weber’s 
reading of different sexualised figurations (e.g. the ‘underdeveloped’, the 
’undevelopable’ and the ‘unwanted im/migrant’) illustrate the need for queer logoi 
of statecraft to be deployed. 
Firstly, Foucault is instrumental in understanding that modern systems of 
power/knowledge/pleasure are based on a production of sexuality rather than a 
repression of sex.66 The focus is on the analysis of effects and functions of such 
productive power, its workings and how assumptions of the normal/perverse are 
static. The production of the ‘perverse homosexual’, as opposed to the ‘normal’ 
Malthusian couple, are the basis for Weber’s link to IR, in that Talcott Parsons’ 
structural-functionalist evolutionary sociology scripts the ‘underdeveloped’ as the 
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‘perverse homosexual’ and Hillary Clinton’s ‘LGBT couple’, which is reproductive 
for the sake of the nation, as the ‘normal homosexual’. Foucault’s method 
highlights the fluidity of figurations of the ‘homosexual’ by focusing on different 
historical representations.67 
Secondly, Haraway’s figurations, built upon Butler’s theory of 
performativity, highlight that “we inhabit and are inhibited by such figures that map 
universes of knowledge, practice and power”.68 The author uses tropes and 
temporalities to elaborate how developmental teleologies highlight the capability 
of the Western European ‘homosexual’ to be placed in progressive correction 
within Victorian societies, whereas other figurations of (queerly) racially darkened 
colonial subjects were considered ‘non-progressive homosexuals’. SOGI is 
therefore seen as a measure of development. Butler’s performativity stresses that 
gender is not a locus of stable agency, but rather an “identity tenuously 
constructed in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylised repetition of 
acts”69 (my emphasis). Haraway draws on Butler, arguing that ‘figurations are 
performative images that can be inhabited’.70 She introduces performativities and 
worldlings to express, respectively, how iterations of acts are constitutive of 
performative subjects and how these contribute to map universes of practice, 
knowledge and power.  
Thirdly, Ashley’s ‘statecraft as mancraft’ provides a poststructuralist 
account of how states (attempt to) freeze such figurations when they enter 
international games of power. Because the ‘sovereign man’ is inscribed in the 
necessary conditions of the ‘sovereign state’, ‘statecraft as mancraft’ produces 
an ordering of IR.71 Ashley argues that the displacement of ‘God’ in favour of 
‘man’ illustrates how the logocentric systems of the middle age to modern age 
have changed.72 As the regime of modernity is an economy of power and it is 
necessary for truth to emanate from a ‘sovereign voice’, modern discourse must 
evoke a sovereign subjectivity of man.73 Consequently, the Logos of modernity 
                                               
67 Weber, 2016: 27-28. 
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70 Haraway apud Weber, 2016: 31 
71 Weber, 2016: 34 
72 Ashley, 1989: 261 
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(the sovereign source of truth) is the ‘modern man’ who acts as sovereign man, 
since it was him that gave the nation-state its authority with the passage of 
monarchical to popular sovereignty (here, paradigms of man are also tools of 
power, as both the effects of transversal struggles - “recognised boundaries 
which impose historical limits” - and means by which they are waged74). The 
modern sovereign nation-state is then tied to the ‘modern man’, or as Ashley 
states, “modern statecraft is modern mancraft”. This spurs modern 
understandings of international order, where figurations of ‘modern man’ and 
‘modern state’ are not stable or ahistorical, being conversely the result of modern 
productions. As Weber claims, “binaries that order domestic and international 
relations constantly […] attempt to stabilise these unreliable hierarchies and the 
figurations that authorise them so they appear to be ahistorical”.75 Ashely’s 
Derridean analysis, like Haraway’s and Foucault’s, provides the basis for 
analysing how figurations are frozen/fixed as well as unfrozen/unfixed. 
It is through these figurations that Weber proposes a queer logoi of 
statecraft based on an and/or pluralised Barthesian logic, since to “miss the 
plurality of the code is to censor the work of the discourse”.76 The embodiment of 
multiple meanings acknowledges the plurality that an either/or singular logic 
excludes, constituting ‘dichotomy-defying subjectivities and (anti)normativities’ 
which translate the essence of queer logoi. These produce new structures of 
understanding that are paradoxically constituted through plural logics and 
contribute to the integrative pluralism deemed needed by Tickner. Equally, they 
provide the tool to analyse if and/or how the EU’s external policy is ethical. 
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CHAPTER 3 – THE INTERNATIONAL AS AN ETHICO-POLITICAL 
SPACE? 
3.1. Grammatical readings of ‘universality’ 
 “Practices of universality, even when they try 
to draw the lines as hard lines, contain within 
themselves their own failure all the time.” 
- Verónique Pin-Fat 
IR scholarship enacts a proclivity to make universal claims, but 
universality’s limitations are precisely its all-encompassing scope. Claims of the 
EU as EPE are an example of such universalist claims, which produce a picture 
of the EU as an ethical player complying with a universal ethical system. 
Approaching ethics in the international space (i.e. implying an assumption of 
universal ethics) is a dangerous endeavour since, as Pin-Fat argues, there is a 
higher amenability towards ethics in domestic rather than international politics. 
This is due to, inter alia, national interests and state sovereignty, but also because 
of the international’s anarchic nature.77 Her grammatical readings of universality 
through Morgenthau (a realist universalist), Beitz (a cosmopolitan universalist) 
and Walzer (a communitarian universalist) are necessary for understanding 
universal ethico-political spaces.  
In trying to analyse pictures of reason in ethico-political space as the 
resolution of moral dilemmas in IR, the universal should be exhorted rather than 
the contingent. Despite defending the universality of moral principles, 
Morgenthau proposes a transcendent/actual grammatical duality, emphasizing 
that morality in international politics is ‘concretised’ ([sic] “overcomes the 
ontological difference between universals and particulars”) through the 
achievement of a moral consensus within national communities. Morgenthau’s 
‘divine universality’ is however limited in territorial scope to the national sphere 
and fails (grammatically) at explaining universal ethics.78 In turn, Beitz stresses 
that the ethico-political space is summarised by an international/domestic divide, 
a lack of state self-sufficiency owing to interdependence on other states (one 
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could read here Beck’s ‘world risk society’79) and an ineffective international 
realm that does not ensure or motivate reciprocal compliance. Building on a 
dichotomical ideal/non-ideal world, through which a ‘realisation‘ of ethical 
standards must occur,80 Beitz proposes an ‘ideal universality’ which also fails 
grammatically at explaining universality. Finally, Walzer maps a dichotomical 
member/stranger (them/us) account of international ethics, deploying thick81 
(member) and thin82 (stranger) universalities to explain humans’ capacity to 
recognise particularism and apply a trans-cultural principle of ethical 
acceptance.83 According to Pin-Fat, all three readings result in conjunctive failure.  
Critically, Pin-Fat argues that, in referring to binary objects 
(transcendent/actual, ideal/non-ideal and member/stranger), the three authors 
grammatically fail, since they tried to establish a difference through suggesting a 
binary distinction. The dichotomy gains meaning because one object’s meaning 
tout court cannot be established without its opposite. Consequently, this either/or 
logic fails, precisely because both opposites are co-constitutive and co-
dependent. ‘Member’ means not only ‘thick’ ways of life, but also ‘not stranger’ 
and ‘ideal’ encompasses everything which is ‘not non-ideal’.84 Although this 
appears esoteric, Pin-Fat’s Wittgensteinian analysis stresses the importance of 
drawing distinctions as lines, which is a feature of attributing meaning. Because 
not all words name objects (e.g. universality, ethics), she proposes that the 
conjunctive failure in reading universal ethics creates another grammatical 
binary: ‘(im)possible ethics’.85 Admittedly, this is a heuristic solution, but it leads 
somewhere. An application of queer logoi would render the previous dichotomies 
more permeable through establishing when one is member and/or stranger, when 
one talks about transcendental and/or actual ethics and in which situations are 
ethics ideal and/or non-ideal, when applied to sexuality/ies. In a Foucauldian 
manner, one could nevertheless argue that it is always impossible to speak of the 
                                               
79 The cosmopolitan notion of de-territorialised dangers of contemporary civilisation (ecological, 
terrorist and economic risks) (Beck, 2004: 137). 
80 Pin-Fat, 2010: 79. 
81 Shared universal understandings of e.g. justice. 
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83 Pin-Fat, 2010: 102.  
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20 
existence of universals.86 
Reflexively, universality is all-encompassing, but it is the analysis of 
language games in IR that matters, since politics is “the practice of drawing lines 
everywhere”. Because universality applies to everyone and/or all cases of 
something, Pin-Fat suggests that the spaces that universality delineates are often 
leaky. When invoking universal concerns (as in EPE), this generates an invitation 
to ask where the exclusions lie, how lines are drawn, why, where, by whom, what 
effects they cause and how do these answers help us understand politics of 
exclusion, inclusion and of representation. This happens because practices of 
universality contain within themselves their own failure. The often dichotomy-
driven IR expounds how “politics draw lines […] [highlighting] what kinds of lives 
and subjects are politically permitted as possible or impossible: politically 
legitimate or illegitimate, legal or illegal, human or inhuman, masculine or 
feminine, normal or abnormal, desirable or undesirable, true or false […].”87 
Reading universality as possible and/or impossible therefore allows for a refining 
of the unnoticed differentiation between philosophical and global universalism. 
Equally, reading universal ethics as an (im)possibility allows for the identification 
of spaces of failure of universality and why they matter, as well as the 
investigation regarding how universalities are produced for the demarcation of 
ontological phenomena which too-often become fait accompli.88 
Respectively, Donnelly distinguishes between an ontological universality 
and an overlapping consensus universality, a conceptual vs substantive 
universality, which explicates the relative universality of human rights.89 Although 
rejecting the potential absolutism of cultural relativism, as well as the potential 
imperialism of conceptual universality tout court, the author states that relative 
universality of human rights can be beneficial to building more humane 
societies.90 This is concomitantly illustrated by Pin-Fat’s distinction between 
philosophical universalism and global universalism, whereby practice is 
privileged over theory in the latter.  
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The emptiness of universality as a signifier does not however mean that it 
is apolitical. Rather, it implies that it must be filled in a variety of ways, which is 
politics’ concern. It is precisely for the politics of inclusion and/or exclusion (and 
of representation) that sexes, genders and sexualities are crucial in affecting the 
representation of the ‘universal human’.91 Interestingly, Chomsky has claimed 
that relativism and hypocrisy are equivalent, but only because he accepts that 
universality must be equivalent to consistency.92 This idea is crucial to 
understand pictures of universality. What are the characteristics of the universal 
human? And do they differ in relation to context? 
Spaces of rupture in consistency represent chasms with notions of 
universality, which proves instrumental for empirical research agendas of EPE’s 
consistency (or lack thereof) in realising (a European notion of) universal ethics. 
This is particularly relevant regarding sexual minorities, given that their level of 
protection in the EU is high vis-à-vis the rest of the world. However, the lack of 
their consideration in the EU-Turkey Statement reflects one such rupture. This 
suggests that 1) the enjoyment of one’s sexual identity is not a characteristic of 
the (European) universal human and therefore need not be considered within 
EPE or 2) that its relevance was generated on account of contextual tensions, 
which resulted in its consideration being absent from the Statement. Both 
hypotheses will be analysed, but they already highlight why a queer 
understanding of universal enjoyment of one’s sexual identity as possible and/or 
impossible is needed.  
 
3.2. Politics of ex/inclusion of SOGI in (European) universal human’s 
rights 
This sub-section assesses whether the full enjoyment of one’s sexual 
identity93 is considered part of the universal human’s rights, with the caveat that 
claims of ‘Western ideological imperialism’94 and ‘colonialism of ideas’ often 
directed at international human rights conventions will be borne in mind. This 
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section does not seek to make universal claims, but rather provide a legal 
analysis that hints at the consideration of SOGI in ‘European universal ethics’. 
For IR purposes, international human rights today equate with the core 
human rights International Covenants (e.g. ICCPR, ICESCR). Despite the 
deriving legal argument that there is a universal possession of human rights, this 
does not equate with a universal enforcement of such rights, since enforcement 
of authoritative international human rights is left to the states.95 To this date, there 
is no UN international covenant on SOGI, with those already signed making no 
mention to it. Nevertheless, this does not imply that states can avail themselves 
of moral arguments to avoid protecting the security of humans who experience 
different SOGI. If a state refuses to award protection against violence on the 
grounds of diverse/non-normative SOGI being considered immoral, then the state 
violates this person’s basic human rights, since these are held no less by the 
moral than the immoral human being.96  
Sexual minorities suffer significant civil disabilities in all countries, often 
being the target of invidious language. This happens, inter alia, because of the 
misconception that diverse/non-normative SOGI is a modern affliction and that it 
is immoral, whereas in fact many currently homophobic societies have tolerated 
or even valued sexual diversity in the past. Despite these pasts, SOGI has only 
recently entered into the international legal and political framework. For this 
purpose, this sub-section shall first address the international context, analysing 
SOGI generally and then SOGI vis-à-vis asylum, followed by the European 
context in both those scenarios. 
For the context of SOGI at the international level, the Toonen case was 
definitive, since the UN Human Rights Committee recognised the reference to 
‘sex’ under Article 2 of the ICCPR as including sexual orientation, thereby 
deciding that a Tasmanian sodomy law criminalising consensual same-sex 
behaviour was unlawful.97 Donnelly argues that it is not clear whether such 
‘evolutive interpretations’ can take place at the UN level, as it can happen in the 
European legal framework, but the reality is that it did. The Yogyakarta Principles 
constitute yet another example, as a non-binding legal document created by 
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SOGI ‘experts’, which stresses that the full enjoyment of one’s sexual identity 
should be a right of every human,98 with the right to humane treatment in 
detention stressing that SOGI are integral to human dignity.99 Critically, the 
position of UN Independent Expert on SOGI, a three-year mandate designed to 
investigate violence and discrimination on account of SOGI,100 has been 
assigned in December 2016 to one of the Yogyakarta Principle’s co-chairperson, 
Vitit Muntarbhorn. The controversial mandate generated substantial opposition 
by mostly African states, but the resolution to suspend the mandate was 
outvoted, with the totality of European states voting against it.101 This move by 
the UN speaks volumes to SOGI’s significance for human beings.  
In the context of SOGI vis-à-vis asylum, the evidence is numerous. The 
UNHCR stated that, concerning SOGI-related claims, asylum-seekers cannot be 
required to change or conceal their identity to avoid persecution (discretion 
reasoning)102 and that they cannot be expected to suppress their SOGI in the 
internal flight area (internal flight alternative) of a country to avoid the reach of 
persecution.103 It also recently released a report on the protection of persons with 
diverse SOGI.104 Most importantly, the UNHCR defines in its asylum guidelines 
that MPSG implies a shared characteristic which is often innate, unchangeable, 
or fundamental to identity or the exercise of one’s human rights.105 Rehaag 
elaborates further on why the latter definition (the fundamentality of such 
characteristic) should be taken as the effective definition, considering the fluidity 
of sexual identities (countering their ‘unchangeability’).106 Moreover, the UNHRC 
has pointed to the effects of refoulement of such asylum-seekers and the 
persecution they might face,107 the Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe has publicly addressed violence in asylum situations108 and 
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the International Commission of Jurists has also publicly addressed SOGI-based 
refugee claims.109 Additionally, the Yogyakarta Principles state in Article 23 that 
the removal, expulsion or extradition of a person to a State where they may face 
persecution on account of SOGI shall be prohibited.110 These examples hint at 
the full enjoyment of one’s SOGI as included in the realm of the universal human’s 
rights, albeit an EU-specific analysis will further illustrate this. 
As concerns SOGI in the EU, apart from having unanimously supported 
the appointment of the UN Independent Expert, SOGI is encompassed in the 
EU’s legal system in both primary and secondary law. For the former, the 
preclusion of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is encompassed in 
Article 21 EUChFR111 and Article 10 TFEU. Other non-EU legislation examples 
include national laws that, depending on the Member States (MS), confer rights 
such as same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples. Concerning 
gender identity, there is no uniform legislation, but legal recognition of trans 
identities and gender-confirmation surgery are already available in some MS. 
Moreover, in the realm of asylum, secondary law is unmistakably clear, 
particularly concerning the two major migration-related Directives.  
The 2011 ‘recast’ Qualification Directive, regulating qualifications for RSD 
in the EU, precludes the internal flight alternative.112 Equally, it now specifically 
adds ‘gender identity’ to the list of characteristics that create a ‘particular social 
group’113 (the 2004 directive already included sexual orientation; this move was 
a result of the pressure put by the EP, making it the first time EU law mentioned 
‘gender identity’114). Moreover, the ‘recast’ Procedures Directive acknowledges 
that certain applicants may be in need of procedural guarantees on account of 
their SOGI115 and awards them personal interviews that are sensitive to these 
particularities.116 Critically, as part of the Commission’s attempted reform of the 
                                               
109 International Commission of Jurists, 2016. 
110 The Yogyakarta Principles, 2007: Article 23. 
111 Which has equal legal value as the Treaties, as per Article 6 TEU. 
112 Whereby one asylum-seeker would be advised to flee to another area of the country in which 
he/she/they would not fear persecution. (Directive 2011/95/EU, ‘Recast Qualification Directive’: 
Article 8) 
113 For RSD to occur, the applicant must be in fear of persecution for one of five reasons. MPSG 
encompasses SOGI-related claims.  
114 This information was obtained through email contact with the EP’s Intergroup on LGBTI Rights. 
115 Asylum Procedures Directive’: (29). 
116 id.: Article 15(3)(a). 
 
25 
Common European Asylum System in 2016, both these directives are underway 
to being upgraded to regulations, which would render persecution on the basis of 
SOGI a Union-wide reality (owing to the proposed Qualification Regulation117) 
and the previously-mentioned procedural concerns as automatically translatable 
into national legislation (owing to the proposed Asylum Procedures 
Regulation118). These are currently being considered by the EP under the 
ordinary legislative procedure.119 Sexual orientation is also acknowledged in 
case-law, with the CJEU recognising in X, Y and Z that asylum-seekers cannot 
be expected to avoid persecution through concealing the expression of their 
sexual orientation (i.e. the ‘discretion reasoning’).120 As a result of years of asylum 
reform, the EU’s ‘evolutive interpretation of the law’ has come closer to 
recognising the full enjoyment of one’s sexual identity in its notion of the universal 
human. Despite the existence of more legislation concerning sexual orientation 
than gender identity, there seems to be a teleological progress towards 
recognising sexual diversity. It can thus be argued that the EU has gradually paid 
more attention to sexuality as part of fundamental human rights. 
Article 10 of the Qualification Directive makes the enlightening point that 
MPSG implies a shared characteristic that is so fundamental to identity that a 
person should not be forced to renounce it.121 This formulation brings to light the 
reality that human rights are not needed for life, but rather for a dignified life. This 
is, summarily, what SOGI implies: a fundamental sub-identity that cannot be 
rejected, like a religious or political sub-identity. Concerning sexual orientation as 
a fundamentally human characteristic, Waaldijk122 articulates an elaborate 
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argument. As an aspect of the right to private life, he proposes the ‘right to relate’, 
whereby a deep inescapable need to relate to other human beings is codified.123 
His proposal originates from an extensive legal analysis that highlights how 
several courts (including the European and Inter-American Courts of Human 
Rights) recognise it.124 This right rejects heteronormativity by implying a right to 
come out and a right to come together with those one feels comfortable with, 
through one of the most social aspects of human life: ‘relatability’. One could (not 
legally, but conceptually) stretch Waaldijk’s proposal vis-à-vis sexual orientation, 
and drawing on Butler’s ‘performativity of gender’, to additionally suggest that 
being precluded from performing or experiencing one’s gender without being 
afflicted by cisnormativity would equate to a restriction on yet another 
characteristic that is fundamental: one’s gender identity. 
As the UN Independent Expert on SOGI claimed at the Council of 
Europe,125 SOGI are two components of sexual identity: one manifests as the 
external dimension (sexual orientation, how one feels towards others) and the 
other as the internal one (gender identity, how one feels about themselves126). 
The legal analysis provided thus far should legitimise the claim that there is, both 
at the international and at the European level, a concern vis-à-vis both of these 
dimensions. In the European context, the EU has shown over time dedication to 
ensure protection of diverse SOGI, particularly concerning the Directives on 
asylum (and respective proposals for regulations). 
There is enough evidence to claim the normative argument that, in the 
conception of European universal ethics, the full enjoyment of one’s sexual 
identity should be a reality. Should such a claim be true, the EU’s lack of its 
consideration in the Statement would then imply that the relevance of SOGI was 
defined on account of contextual tensions and that Ban Ki-moon’s words that 
LGBT rights are often neglected127 was effectively materialised. It is precisely this 
rupture with the EU’s political ethos concerning sexuality that is under analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 – FOREIGN POLICY ACCORDING TO HILL 
4.1. Conundrums in foreign policy agency 
Hill argues in “The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy” that foreign policy 
is central to IR and susceptible to multiple responsibilities (inter alia, voters, 
humanity in general, international law, the UN). Accordingly, it is complicated to 
reconcile competing claims.128 Nevertheless, he states that foreign policy is 
poised with rationality. Distinguishing it from realism, he proposes the ‘rational 
actor model’, which privileges cooperation between states. 
It is crucial to note now that the Statement was signed, on the European 
side, by the members of the European Council (EC) during the European summit 
of March 18th, 2016. This is significant for the purpose of the critiques to the 
‘rational actor model’ which highlight four rationalist-constructivist tensions 
presented by Hill in his book.129 Procedural v. substantive rationality illustrates 
that certain procedures might be rational and result in negative outcomes (e.g. 
the consideration of Turkey as a STC in order to agree on a deal which, vis-à-vis 
sexual minorities is flawed; cf. sub-chapter 5.5). Individual v. collective tensions 
concomitantly illustrate that certain issues might be overlooked, since the 
members of the European Council may want to accomplish both personal 
interests (avoiding the overburden on their Member States) and professional 
responsibility (finding a European solution to the migration issue), while trying to 
find a way to satiate the concerns of the objects of their agency into a singular 
set of preferences (giving asylum-seekers ‘protection’, regardless of the 
circumstances). Efficiency v. democracy insightfully suggests that pursuing 
efficiency can be compromised by democratic goals and vice-versa (such as the 
protection of asylum-seekers’ purported security, neglecting the enjoying of their 
sexual identities) and, lastly, normative v. positive rationality would illustrate the 
dilemma at hand by postulating that the ethical thing to do would be to protect 
these sexual minorities more extensively. 
 Hill argues that rationality is almost impossible owing to severe problems 
of uncertainty and to ‘rational foreign policy’ not being omniscient, but rather 
empirically constructed. Rationality is then ‘bounded’, which can suggest that it 
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might be preferable to satisfy or accept the outcome which most approximates to 
one’s preferences (proposing a ‘good enough’ solution rather than a perfect 
one).130 Once can briefly undertake here the two tests he proposes for foreign 
policy in IR: understanding why actors take the positions they do and explaining 
their outputs.131  
The EC has the power to adopt acts having legal effect under the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Why the Statement was signed is explained 
by the urgency of the situation, since the migration crisis reached unprecedented 
proportions. Additionally, the EU politically committed to accelerate the 
negotiations of visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals and to re-activate Turkey’s 
accession process. Conversely, the output for LGBTIQ asylum-seekers is that 
their protection and security was (intentionally or negligently) considered an 
acceptable trade-off to Turkey’s (deficient) burden-sharing. Should one accept 
Hill’s premise of ‘bounded rationality’, the instated deal would have satisfied the 
need for political action, even if its cost was the non-encompassment of sexual 
minorities. Taking into account the arguments proposed in Chapter 3, one could 
however make the claim that such a foreign policy acquiesces more to a 
‘muddling through’. This can be stated regarding the reported generalised 
collective pushbacks and refoulements, but more specifically vis-à-vis the lack of 
recognition of the centrality of SOGI for LGBTIQ asylum-seekers.  
The latter argument reflects why the sufficiency of the Statement must be 
questioned. Importantly, Pin-Fat’s claim of human rights as (im)possible is 
materialised here, since the full enjoyment of LGBTIQ asylum-seekers’ diverse 
SOGI was arguably made impossible in the current deal (cf. sub-chapter 5.5). 
The EC members were elevated to the status of gatekeepers and, deciding to 
which extent the previously-mentioned tensions are central or peripheral to 
decision-making in the CFSP, they also (in)directly decided whether the full 
enjoyment of one’s SOGI in asylum contexts (and particularly for the Statement) 
is an essential part of European universal ethics.  
In a Foucauldian manner, one could argue that such dominant discursive 
structures have produced a set of norms that legitimise agents exercising power 
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over other agents. The EC members then deploy such power, the effect of which 
is the regulation of sexual conformity through the (re)production of normalcy and 
perversity concerning sexual identities in Turkey, i.e. a sexualised ‘technology of 
power’ (cf. sub-chapters 5.4 and 5.5). In so doing, the EC simultaneously 
legitimised (willingly or not) Turkey’s deployment of such a regulatory technology 
by not acknowledging its effects. 
Having shown that rationality in foreign policy is flawed, what becomes 
evident is how (high-level political) agency plays a role in effecting the recognition 
of sexual identities as central to LGBTIQ asylum-seekers. 
 
4.2. Ethics as ‘effectively deployed’ 
Contrary to Beitz’s account of a lack of ‘sense of community’ in national 
contexts, the EU is more cohesive. Its communitarian nature acquiesces to 
shared legislation and principles which give it a higher proclivity towards acting 
ethically. How can one therefore judge the morality of action in IR?  
In a heuristic fashion, Morgenthau’s ‘concretisation’ and Beitz’s 
‘realisation’ of moral principles already provide a useful clue: that of agency rather 
than ontology. Like Manners suggested concerning EPE, ethico-political spaces 
are constructed through a developmental teleology of ethics based on agency, a 
process of becoming increasingly more ethical rather than a state of (already) 
being ethical, on the basis of how the EU acts. Nevertheless, ethical principles 
are only pillars if consistently applied and incrementally defended. One could ask: 
is this teleology unidirectional or can it be reversed, as suggested by Hyde-Price’s 
‘strategic selectivity of structures’? Can the EU become and un-become/act and 
not act ethical/ly with respect to particular constraints or is there, like Dunne 
argues, a neutral ‘middle ground’? 
There are many ways in which foreign policy can be ‘non-rational’. The 
claim this paper makes is that such an inconsistency with the EU’s proven record 
of respect for SOGI generated a rupture regarding a European notion of universal 
ethics. A ‘strategic selectivity of structure’, as Hyde-Price would argue, has arisen 
on account of the foreign policy tensions in dealing with the migration crisis, albeit 
not because there was no other possible solution (granting refugee status to 
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LGBTIQ applicants in Europe would have been one).132  
The argument proposed is that in order for the EU to be an EPE, ethics 
must not only be politically defended (e.g. in official documents),133 but rather 
effectively deployed as part of the foreign policy deals negotiated. For this deal, 
that means acknowledging the importance of SOGI vis-à-vis asylum. 
In order to elaborate on EPE’s rupture and better illustrate Turkey’s (and 
ergo, Europe’s) shortcoming in SOGI protection, the next chapter presents a case 
study that should prove definitive. While acknowledging the shortcomings of 
case-studies for research agendas (owing to false generalisations), the purpose 
is precisely to deploy an empirical analysis through the application of EPE to a 
particular foreign policy deal. Ticker argues that case-studies allow for issues in 
the non-core (e.g. LGBTIQ claims) to be linked to the core, therefore generating 
relevant theory.134 In so doing, this paper will further establish the centrality of 
sexuality/ies to IR. 
 
 
 
                                               
132 This is claimed while recognising the possible increase of asylum claims related to SOGI; 
however, it relies on the well-functioning of the Common European Asylum System to duly 
assess the validity of those claims, as regulated by the respective Directives. 
133 Such as Article 21 TEU, which encompasses respect for human dignity and principles of 
solidarity, as well as support for human rights and international law. 
134 Picq & Thiel, 2015: 10. 
 
31 
CHAPTER 5 – CASE-STUDY: TURKEY 
5.1. Turkey’s cosmopolitan/communitarian dichotomy and the 2016 
failed putsch 
Dal argues that the Cold War resulted in a gradual normative turn, in which 
the BRICS and other nations (e.g. Turkey) incrementally sought to project their 
own normative power. Based on this premise, he analyses how Turkish foreign 
policy, through the lens of the Syrian conflict, evidences cosmopolitan or 
communitarian tendencies.135 
Turkey has since its establishment as a republic been defined by a 
secularist and democracy-oriented Kemalist doctrine,136 approximating the 
country to a ‘Westernised way of living’. Until the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy 
was essentially communitarian. However, in the post-Cold war context, Turkey 
became increasingly involved in the international level, with regional interests 
gaining relevance.137 Between 1999 and 2002, with Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, 
Turkey embraced multilateralism in dealing with global challenges, emphasizing 
the role of democracy and human rights. By 2002, when the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) won the legislative elections, Turkish foreign policy 
was a mixture of communitarian-cosmopolitan ideals. This reflected in its 
mediating of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian conflicts, as well as in the 
Turkish-Brazilian-Iranian nuclear deal. These events evidenced an approach to 
ethical world affairs and peacebuilding,138 which pervaded in Turkey’s attitude 
towards the Syrian crisis. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s position at the UN further 
corroborates this,139 as does the criticism of the Security Council’s veto that 
resulted in the UN’s inaction. Both show a cosmopolitan tendency, which 
nevertheless cannot be realised without international support. Dal asserts that a 
more authoritative turn in 2015 made observers wonder about the internalisation 
of universal norms of human rights, and the 2016 putsch signified just that.  
                                               
135 Dal, 2015: 422-424. 
136 This started with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. 
137 Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015: 409. 
138 Dal, 2015: 427. 
139 “If we cannot regard the rights of a person in Syria, Palestine, Somalia, Afghanistan and 
Rakhine region and other places as equal as of our own, how can we talk about freedom and 
justice? [...] how are we to achieve universal human rights and security?” (Davutoğlu apud Dal, 
2015: 430) 
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Turkey’s AKP came to power despite secularist challenges in the 2007 
presidential election and even a legal case aimed at banning it. However, an 
alliance with Fethullah Gülen’s Islamic network effectively countered Kemalists 
and, by 2007, the AKP had secured dominance. However, instead of privileging 
democracy, the AKP fostered an authoritarian regime, using state institutions for 
party objectives, subjecting the media to political scrutiny, abusing the judiciary 
to target opponents and curtailing political opposition. The Gülenists, who had 
benefited from the coalition against the Kemalists, were gradually alienated. The 
putsch was (according to current consensus) the Gülenists’ last attempt at 
undermining President Erdoğan’s power.140 Nevertheless, it failed, faced with the 
largest resistance in Turkish coups so far, owing to civilian opposition. Critically, 
the largest part of this opposition was linked to the AKP, which has a centrally-
administered communications network that establishes a direct link with 
registered members since 2001 and which promotes a conservative-nationalist 
ideology.141 
The consequent crackdown undertaken by Erdoğan’s government in the 
post-coup, as a result of an emergency law passed on July 21st 2016, has been 
widely covered. Consequences involve, inter alia, shrinking political opposition, 
restricting media and academic freedom, and curtailing human rights advocacy. 
This putsch is critical to understanding the current socio-political Turkish context. 
Having briefly addressed it, the following sub-chapter elaborates on the 
constraints that an ideology like ‘conservative democracy’ (AKP’s self-proclaimed 
political identity) creates concerning SOGI. 
 
5.2. Conservative democracy and the ‘traditionalisation’ of Turkish 
social life 
Understanding the AKP’s ideology is fundamental to understanding the 
development of LGBTIQ rights in Turkey, since its victory in 2002 coincides with 
the consolidation of the LGBTIQ movement in the 2000s. 
Upon AKP’s creation, its leaders wanted to disown claims of affiliation with 
Islamism. The definition of its identity as ‘conservative democrat’ by Yalçın 
                                               
140 Esen & Gumuscu, 2017: 60-61. 
141 As a result of this, 57% of the opposing civilians were AKP party members and 83% had voted 
for AKP in the Turkish general elections. (Esen & Gumuscu, 2017: 64) 
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Akdoğan, advisor to Erdoğan, provided such an umbrella. Drawing on modern 
conservative political theory, he argued that modern conservatism is almost 
indistinguishable from liberalism in its free market proclivity and anti-socialist 
sentiment. Equally, it emphasises authority in the social field. Concerning 
democracy, the conservatism-liberalism relationship becomes more contentious. 
For Akdoğan, democracy is a method for “peaceful coexistence of adverse 
lifestyles”. Conservative democracy therefore stresses participatory democracy 
as an acknowledgement of difference and mutual tolerance. To realise tolerance 
as a “political imperative in the age of identity politics”, conservative democracy 
must create a pluralistic political environment, which is conversely reinforced by 
‘national values’, Turkey’s own conservative pillar. This cornerstone of 
substantive values symbolises the liberal democracy/conservative democracy 
divide.142 
Because conservatism epitomises the substantive ‘public good’, it 
obfuscates liberalism’s democratic process of operating natural rights. The 
differences acknowledged by individualism in liberalism are dissipated by the 
‘organicism of conservatism’. The ensuing result is an amalgamation of the state 
and the nation, operated through structural socialising diffused by, and dominant 
social units such as, the family, school and community. This merges public good 
with national values, the state with the nation. Akdoğan’s focus on the family as 
the most important social institution qua agent of socialisation and vehicle of 
tradition is further evidenced by his claim that “Westernisation needs to be a 
selective process in order to prevent social degeneration.”143 This focus on how 
power is translated over the familiar social structure, operated as ‘tradition’ and 
promoted as ‘public good’, preventing the degeneration of the national individual, 
illustrates a remarkable Foucauldian discursive structure that normalises (and 
perverts diverse/non-traditional) identities. Constituting the AKP as the 
democratic representative, power over national values is effected in the 
normal/pervert through (supposed) tradition and becomes a hegemonic project. 
Conservative democracy resorts to what Birdal names an “invention of 
tradition”,144 which regulates, apart from the school, family and community, other 
                                               
142 Birdal, 2013: 120. 
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aspects of life (e.g. sexual normalcy/perversity). Therefore, it is understandable 
that the ‘otherisation’ of the LGBTIQ movement and politics of recognition vis-à-
vis SOGI are quickly rejected, owing to tradition. Demands for legal and social 
equality are efficiently subjugated to their conformity with a ‘politically constructed 
national identity’,145 with LGBTIQs being restricted to their ‘right to live’.  
Pin-Fat’s (im)possible human rights returns to the fore with tradition 
deployed as AKP’s gatekeeper, operating eligibility and in turn rejecting non-
normative/diverse sexual identities. Turkey’s own normative power is deployed 
through the AKP’s ruling, and deeply opposes that of the EU in the recognition of 
full enjoyment of SOGI as a fundamental human characteristic. Because the AKP 
defines tradition (and, consequently, what is normal/perverse), its cosmopolitan 
vision of ethics allows for the recognition of universal human rights, particularly 
concerning asylum-seekers (cf. footnote 139), which differs substantially from 
that of the EU’s concerning SOGI, highlighting once more the falsity of 
‘universalities’. We shall now draw on Weber to analyse the case at hand. 
 
5.3. Figurations of the ‘underdeveloped’ and the ‘undevelopable’ 
Weber postulates that the image of the sovereign man, which instates 
‘statecraft as mancraft’, arises and produces heteronormativity. Thus, it is crucial 
to trace the conditions in which figurations of the ‘perverse homosexual’ arise, 
the conditions through which developmental heteronormative discourses are 
stabilised as a problem and the solutions provided to the problem thereby raised. 
Since the ‘perverse homosexual’ enables the production of ‘order-versus-anarchy 
binaries’, the either/or binaries participate in the regulation of international 
politics, given their establishment of sexualised orders of international relations 
(normal/pervert). Weber argues that figurations of the ‘underdeveloped’ and 
‘undevelopable’ enable the understanding of relationships to evolutionary time 
and geopolitical space that is ‘classed, (dis)ableised, racialised, gendered, sexed 
and sexualised’. These figurations’ effect is the production of networks of 
power/knowledge/pleasure in relation to the figures of the ‘homosexual’146 (and 
as will be shown, owing to Turkey’s traditionally frozen notions of sexual 
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experience, the ‘sexually divergent’). 
The ‘underdeveloped’ arose in the post-WWII as a threatening figure 
resulting of colonial empires. It figured as a “primitive ignorant species-life whose 
political socialisation and political development required Western guidance” (the 
implantation of a desire for the ‘right kind of development’, i.e. ‘a civilising course 
from decadence to decency’). This mapped a teleological progression from the 
irrational and local tribalism to a modern Western capitalist and political 
liberalism. Huntington depicted this as the ‘Grand Process of Modernisation’, 
through which the Great Dichotomy between traditional and modern societies 
was bridged.147 Contrastingly, the ‘undevelopable’ figured as the one who failed 
to achieve Western development, creating even larger threats to Western 
security.  
These figurations produce an order-versus-anarchy dichotomy and are 
mapped in a unidirectional and teleological modernisation process. They place 
the ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘undevelopable’ in the lesser pole of a spatial hierarchy, 
characterising them as “figures of perversion in/of evolutionary time.”148 Weber 
draws on Hoad, who claims that both degeneracy and decadency are 
developmental tropes, with the previous signifying “falling back into an earlier 
time” and the latter “bringing into the present a never-to-be reached state”.149  
The ‘underdeveloped’ as the ‘degenerate’ suffers from an arrested 
development (which is temporally perverse), given that it fails to comply with 
Talcott Parson’s structural-functionalist procreative nuclear family. This social 
unit is the one driving social development because it galvanises biological and 
social reproduction. Since ‘the homosexual’ has no reproductive function, it 
follows that it has no developmental function either.150 Similarly to the ‘female’ 
being regarded as biologically degenerate vis-à-vis the ‘male’, the ‘homosexual’ 
is regarded as biologically degenerate vis-à-vis the ‘heterosexual’.151 The 
developmental onus of the ‘underdeveloped’ comes through Freud, who posits 
that the ‘homosexual’ is an underdeveloped figure in arrested development in the 
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normal sexual progression towards heterosexuality.152 Performing such a 
denaturalisation of homosexuality through a developmental logic, and thereby 
robbing the homosexual of parity vis-à-vis the heterosexual, Freud claims that 
the West, the civilised, have already been primitive. Accordingly, he establishes 
a ‘temporalisation of space’: through a phylogenetic account, he proposes that 
contemporary non-European cultures are representatives of Europe’s past. This 
allows one to retain the esteem towards ancient European civilisations and 
regard contemporary ‘homosexuals’ as arrested in their development. The 
Western European ‘homosexual’s goal was therefore to be placed under 
corrective progression in order to live within Victorian societies and gradually 
achieve heterosexuality. 
Conversely, the ‘undevelopable’ signifies not only a temporal perversion 
in the developmental process, but a perversion of the developmental process. It 
is ‘developmentally non-functional’. Since Parsons suggests that development is 
functionalist, what is non-procreative and non-heterosexual rejects its 
foundations.153 Notably, Parson’s notion that evolutionary biology is the 
guarantee of the social system implies that the legitimate social unit is the nuclear 
family, composed of a (cis)man and a (cis)woman. Familiar disequilibrium 
originates from, e.g. not procreating or not identifying with the gender assigned 
at birth. These generate ‘disorganisation of society as whole’.154 The Parsonian 
family is therefore ensured (internally) by a compulsorily cisgender identity and 
(externally by) a compulsorily reproductive heterosexuality. Deviance from that 
objective is the affirmation of an undevelopable-ness that distorts the societal 
tissue, since the nuclear family is the first socialisation structure. 
In the event of these claims sounding anachronistic, Weber argues that 
examples of policies from Bretton Woods (wanting to regulate sex as a critical 
component of social and economic development policies) or the World Bank 
(stating that heterosexual couplehood is an informal institution necessary for 
development) promptly suggest their contemporary relevance.155 With the caveat 
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that Weber’s focus is on the figurations of the ‘homosexual’ through imperialist 
and racialised discourses, a similar logic can be verified in the Turkish context. 
Factually, Turkey acknowledges the (heterosexual and cisgender) nuclear family 
as foundational for the state. Exhorted in a Parsonian manner, the family is the 
first socialising unit, providing considerable support for tradition’s entrenchment 
in Turkish society and being pervaded by the same developmental logic. Turkish 
traditions, which are (re)produced by the AKP, as Birdal claims with ‘the invention 
of tradition’, therefore exclude figures of the ‘homosexual’, but also those of the 
‘pre-operative transgender’ (in its non-conformance with traditional gender 
norms), the ‘post-operative transsexual’ (in both its non-conformance and 
sterility), the ‘intersex’ (as the ‘abomination’ that is in between both sexes) and 
the ‘queer’ (characterised by its failure to signify monolithically in various [sexual] 
instances). Accordingly, viewing such queer figures who fail to signify 
monolithically as normal and/or perverse illustrates how sexualities are 
(re)produced by the logic of ‘modern statecraft as modern mancraft’ in AKP-ruled 
Turkey. Particularly in a post-putsch context, the emphasis on regulation and 
restriction is even more emphasised.  
The importance of developmental temporality to the ‘homosexual’ 
furthermore extends to Turkey’s discourse on modernity/tradition, whereby 
regulating Western degeneration is needed (Akdoğan). In fact, freezing 
‘Westernisation’ in order to reify tradition is an indication of the prevalent view 
that diverse SOGI is a contemporary Western affliction. Fundamentally, the usual 
ostracisation of sexual diversity as foreign reflects a discursive and sexualised 
technology of power that expounds how distinctions between the ‘foreign’ and the 
‘domestic’ are effected. To illustrate this, it is necessary to draw on Weber again.  
 
5.4. The ‘perverse homosexual’ as the ‘unwanted im/migrant’ 
For LGBTIQ asylum-seekers, the situation in Turkey is even more severe. 
They are not only sexually deviant/divergent but also foreign and on the move. 
Much like Mead stated that ‘American character’ in the post-WWII needed to be 
separated from the ‘irredeemably foreign’, the Turkish context highlights the 
same vis-à-vis tradition-forfeiting ‘sexually deviant’/degenerate queers. Those 
who forfeit tradition are seen as ‘others’ not only socially, but also legally (due to 
the lack of their protection or acknowledgement in anti-discrimination laws) and 
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politically (with their identities not being recognised by the AKP [which shapes 
perceptions of normality] or their voices being rejected in public discourse and 
advocacy through restriction of their freedoms). Mead’s position of the 
‘irredeemably foreign’ was de facto imported into IR through Huntington’s 
‘civilizational other’.156 
Weber’s figuration of the ‘unwanted im/migrant’ signifies not only ‘civilising 
development on the move’ but also ‘civilisation on the move’, one that brings the 
unfinished developmental process with it. This figure is the ‘outsider, inside the 
Culture’ (Mead) or the ‘outsider, inside the Civilisation’ (Huntington), therefore 
symbolising a risk to the West. What IR often neglects, as a result of relegating 
sexuality to the private domain (the family) instead of the public (the state), is that 
this also symbolises ‘sexual development on the move’. Weber claims that 
reading this figure accordingly permits identifying security risks to the developed 
Western/Northern home, alongside giving rise to sexualised orders of 
international relations that securitise the national figures (allowing white, 
Christian, bourgeois, heterosexual, cisgender Westerners to feel more at ease in 
their homeland, i.e. what Bigo terms the ban-opticon157).158  
Because this figuration of the Westerner instils normalisation, 
(post)colonial subjects on the move are civilisationally and sexually 
‘underdeveloped’ (if they have been implanted with a desire towards civilising as 
sexual development) or ‘undevelopable’ (if they have not). Where the homeland 
is the domain of the procreative nuclear family, sex is compulsory cisgender, 
heterosexual, procreative and, importantly, in the service of the homeland. The 
latter is the locus of civilising sexual development.159 Where such a 
developmental logic is deployed, implying a unidirectional telos, ‘queer 
movement’ is fundamentally different. As Michael Warner states, it is a 
‘movement aslant, sideways’,160 since it might involve rejecting normalised sexual 
categories of orientation, behaviour, identity and expression, thus epitomising 
fluidity rather than rigidity. This renders the consideration of developmental tropes 
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of degeneracy or decadency (Hoad) as inapplicable and rather meaningless, 
since the (un)intentional act of forfeiting the telos of developmental time might 
better be explained by a ‘queer art of failure’. As the figure who falls outside such 
developmental narratives, the ‘unwanted im/migrant’ becomes the ‘sexual 
outsider, inside the home’, a ‘figure of unease’ (that endangers Bigo’s easement 
of the Westerner). 
Whereas the caveat of Weber’s conceptualisation has already been 
admitted, of these figurations relating to a discourse on Northern, Western, 
post(colonial) space/time vis-à-vis the sexual other, it is important to notice that 
the translation of such figures to the Turkish context is possible. Indeed, 
Haraway’s ‘figurations’ are ‘performative images that can be inhabited’ and 
Haraway avails herself of ‘worldlings’ (cf. sub-chapter 2.3) to express how 
figurations map universes of power. Consequentially, Weber’s ‘unwanted 
im/migrant’ can be transposable to Turkey.  
The developmental time that Weber expounds concerns a ‘Western’ 
modernisation. Albeit different from the Turkish context, Turkey’s investment in 
its own modernisation happened during the Kemalist period. In Erdoğanist 
Turkey, the lens of Islamic traditionalism troubles this modernisation but, while 
reifying the ‘otherisation’ of the ‘homosexual’, it enforces its own normative 
power. The originated sexualised technology of power is transversal to figurations 
of other ‘sexually divergent’ queer figures. Consequently, LGBTIQ asylum-
seekers as the ‘unwanted im/migrants’ are identifiable in Turkey as threats to the 
homeland’s own heterosexual and cisgender reproductive order, which is built 
upon traditional values of sexual normalcy (drawn from the Quran and 
shaped/modified/adapted to fit the AKP’s notions of Islamic tradition). In fact, 
Rahman addresses the opposition between Muslim cultures and LGBTIQ politics 
by portraying Muslim homophobia as cultural ‘traditionalism’ that derives from a 
lack of modernisation in Muslim populations and beliefs. 
Acknowledging the limits of generalisations, he draws on Beckers’ claim 
that some tendencies are putatively common to Muslim cultures.161 The latter’s 
analysis through the World Value Survey findings in particular Muslim-majority 
nations shows that the level of acceptance towards homosexuality was 
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consistently between 1981-2008. Such evidence supports the claim of religion as 
the catalyser for Muslim opposition towards sexual diversity and that of queer 
visibility aligned with a progressive modernity (derived from Western 
modernisation).162 Rahman however rejects the notion of a consistent ‘Muslim 
civilisational response to homosexuality’, but asserts that this evidence gains 
relevance in the discourse of a uniform Islamic homophobia. Because queer 
rights (as designated by Rahman) gained the putative status of ‘markers of 
(Western) modernisation’, they are also systematically contested by traditionalist 
nations, who see it as a necessary defiance of the purported West’s normative 
power (Westernisation), rejecting their ‘accelerated modernity’. Importantly, 
Rahman draws on Islamic-influenced sentiments towards sexual diversity 
through an analysis on nationwide acceptance of it. As a result, Rahman’s 
position is evoked to expound a higher tendency for Islamic traditionalism to reject 
homosexuality, which does not definitively align experience of Muslim religious 
identity with a compulsory homophobia.  
All these claims pertain to Turkey in a particular manner, in the sense that 
identities/sexualities that diverge from the holon of the familiar social unit are 
detrimentally rejected. By not conforming with traditional views of the nuclear 
family and threatening to not temporally develop according to tradition, perverting 
the basic social unit, the ‘unwanted im/migrant’ as the ‘sexual other on the move’ 
questions and challenges the boundaries of tradition in Turkey and assumes the 
status of the ‘deviant’. 
This queer reading of figurations of the ‘homosexual’ (which persist in 
other sexual identities – the ‘sexually divergent’ – due to their non-conformance 
with tradition) allow to question the classification of Turkey as a STC, providing a 
space for the questioning of its purported ‘safety’ for sexual minorities.  
In order to progress and concretise such claims, the level of abstraction 
will now be reduced, exemplifying particularly how this takes place through 
Cragnolini’s field research in challenges in refugee status determination (RSD) 
and living conditions in Turkey. 
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5.5. Turkey as a safe haven? 
LGBTIQ asylum-seekers in Turkey face two major challenges: being 
foreigners seeking asylum and being LGBTIQ. However, other issues arise in 
Turkey. 
Because of Turkey’s geographical limitation on the Geneva Convention, 
this results in non-European asylum-seekers (the majority) only being granted 
temporary asylum in Turkey until their RSD by the UNHCR grants them 
resettlement. De facto, this means that, despite being considered refugees by the 
UNHCR under international law if their asylum claims result in RSD, in Turkish 
territory they only have a right to temporary protection as asylum-seekers, 
essentially having the status of ‘transit refugees’.163 Asylum-seekers are 
subjected to parallel procedures with the Turkish Ministry of Interior for temporary 
protection and with the UNHCR for RSD. The latter can only happen after they 
have been issued an identification card by the Ministry,164 which assigns them to 
a satellite city for residence purposes. Posteriorly, they have to apply for a 
residence permit (ikamet), which allows for social assistance, work and 
sometimes medical assistance. Critically, this residence permit has to be 
renewed every 6 months and has an associated cost which is already prohibitive 
to some, given that all family members are required to have one and that most of 
these people are left to survive on their own without much state help.165 Once 
recognised as refugees by the UNHCR, they are granted temporary asylum in 
Turkey. In 2011, most LGBTIQ refugees were Iranian and gay, amounting to 110-
200 persons.166 It is expected that those numbers have recently surged, as a 
result of, among others, the rise of the Islamic State’s regional influence. 
Furthermore, the asylum process has to be conducted in respect of the 
principle of non-refoulement, which provides a safety net for asylum-seekers in 
fear of persecution. Controversially, Turkey has been proven to be a ‘persistent 
objector’.167 Zieck’s analysis of Turkish cases at the ECtHR reflects that Turkey’s 
asylum system is severely flawed, registering omissions to conduct rigorous 
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scrutiny of asylum claims that deportation would result in inhuman or degrading 
treatment, as precluded by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. This is particularly concerning, since the UNHCR does not conduct such 
assessments, which complicates asylum procedures. Additionally, there are 
procedural flaws, and Turkey often rejects temporary asylum to persons whose 
cases have been re-opened after rejection, in cases done in perceived ‘bad faith’ 
by the authorities and to asylum-seekers applying for asylum in airports, among 
others.168 As a result, despite being bound to observe the above-mentioned 
Article 3, the protection awarded only materialises if other conditions are fulfilled, 
which results in it becoming conditional and therefore contingent. 
Moreover, during the UNHCR procedure, despite asylum-seekers usually 
showing satisfaction, claims of unnecessary questions relating to ‘obsessive 
attention to sexual details’ (in order to assess credibility) were reported. During 
the Turkish procedure, LGBTIQs were often recommended to change their 
appearance, reducing the risks of being locally targeted (de facto, concealing 
their identities through ‘living discreetly’, as precluded in the EU by the X, Y and 
Z CJEU case). Most asylum-seekers also felt that police protection was not 
forthcoming. As for Turkey’s consideration as a STC, there are no laws protecting 
against discrimination on accounts of SOGI and the three biggest LGBTIQ NGOs 
(Lambda Istambul, Kaos GL and Pink Triangle Izmir) have iteratively been 
brought to court over accusations of “fuelling immorality”, “violating values and 
family structures” and “going against Turkish identity”.169 Whereas LGBs can 
sometimes ‘live discreetly’, transgenders face more violence and discrimination 
due to being more visible. Cragnolini conducted fieldwork in Kayseri, which 
alongside being one of the most conservative cities, hosts the most Iranian 
LGBTIQ refugees. Because of discrimination, many LGBTIQs asked to be sent 
there, with some being sent there automatically given the (expected) ‘community 
support’. Regardless, LGBTIQ refugees here were systematically harassed, 
attacked and discriminated against, not only by the locals but also by other 
Iranians seeking refuge. As a result, crimes often went unreported, owing to fears 
of retaliation from local communities and of delay in resettlement claims.170 
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Concerning living conditions, because Turkish law grants foreigners the 
possibility of receiving a working permit only if a qualified national is not found, 
illegal labour is recurrent. LGBTIQs face higher discrimination and harassment in 
the work place, with sex work being sometimes a survival option. Vis-à-vis 
housing, similar difficulties persist concerning discrimination, which are 
transversal to getting mistreated in access to education (language classes) and 
health care or social assistance. These issues cause pervasive feelings of non-
existence, which have resulted in several documented suicidal attempts.171 All of 
these situations have been reported in 2011. With the recent massive inflow of 
asylum-seekers, the situation is now dire, as many more are now present in 
Turkey. Regardless of the time difference, these claims remain true, as can be 
assessed by a 2016 report by Kaos GL. 
Kaos reports that terminology such as ‘public morality’, ‘obscenity’ and ‘the 
Turkish familiar structure’ is often used by judges and government officials to 
prevent LGBTIQs from exercising basic rights.172 Due to lack of reception 
centres, refugees are still allocated to satellite cities. Applicants continuously 
state the difficulty of talking about their identities, which they have spent a lifetime 
hiding and which they are still afraid of disclosing. This increases when being 
required to disclose the reasons for fleeing in a room with other applicants, while 
devoid of privacy. Terminology is also crucial, since asylum-seekers are often 
unaware of the internationally accepted terms and might not know how to address 
their identity.173 Furthermore, discrimination during the assessments still occur, 
owing to officers’ lack of training and ignorance concerning SOGI issues.174 Vis-
à-vis housing, language barriers and exclusion from solidarity networks affect the 
chances of LGBTIQs securing safe accommodation. Concealment of identities 
(particularly among trans women) is common in order to secure accommodation 
and avoid eviction.175 Access to health care is also crucially problematic for trans 
refugees. With some doctors being unaware of gender confirmation surgery and 
                                               
171 id.: 110. 
172 Kaos GL, 2016: 10. 
173 Often, trans refugees are emotionally aware of their gender identity but unaware of the 
terminology to define it. It is common for them to only realise they are trans after getting help 
from LGBTI NGOs. 
174 Kaos GL, 2016: 33-37. 
175 id.: 37-38. 
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hormone therapy,176 social security not covering such costs and refugees not 
having the financial means to secure access to health care, they often suffer 
harsh psychological consequences. Their physical and emotional well-being 
suffers major consequences due to lack of hormones, which may and does result 
in suicidal attempts. As for working life, whereas gay men can easily find a job in 
the textile sector (working 12 hours a day with only one day off and in bad working 
conditions), trans refugees often face higher difficulty owing to their visibility (and 
therefore must often conceal their identities). Sometimes, work is not 
remunerated, as a result of the discrimination. Finally, social life is extremely 
hard. Many LGBTIQs are forced to remain home, in isolation, to avoid violence, 
harassment and persecution. The climate is one of constant fear and experience 
of persecution, with normalised homophobia and transphobia. Lack of police 
protection (and prevalence of police discrimination) often results in refugees 
feeling more pessimistic after arriving in Turkey and facing the reality there.177 
These accounts suggest that Turkey is not a psychological or legal safe haven 
and therefore fundamentally question its inclusion in the list of STCs and SCO. 
Conclusively, LGBTIQ refugees in Turkey are often seen as border figures 
both in respect of their ‘foreign-ness’ and of their sexuality. They often have to 
‘un-become’ precisely what made them refugees in the first place, hiding, 
repressing and restraining their identities in order to comply with the Turkish 
(traditional) ‘normal’. This art of unbecoming, unlike in ‘The Queer Art of 
Failure’,178 is not intentional. Whereas Halberstam claims that ‘if at first one 
cannot succeed, then failure may be his/her style’,179 this does not translate into 
one’s forced subjugation to the figure of ‘permanent (and ‘failed’) outsider’ who 
must blend in, despite always living outside the glorified loci of normatively 
‘successful’ sexual identities. 
Reflexively, returning to the Asylum Procedures Directive conditions 
exposed in Chapter 1, it appears that 1) LGBTIQ asylum-seekers face systematic 
persecution on account of their SOGI; 2) that they are at risk of serious harm 
                                               
176 The gender confirmation process is regulated in Article 40 of the Turkish Civil Code, being 
available only to citizens, not refugees, and being highly flawed. 
177 Kaos GL, 2016: 38-49. 
178 Halberstam, 2011. 
179 id.: 96. 
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(consider the state of destitution faced180); 3) that Turkey’s compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement is not consistently observed;181 and 4) that the 
geographical limitation renders them only ‘temporarily protected’ (although this 
‘protection’ is, as expounded, highly questionable). 
Accordingly, the official Statement emphasising respect for international 
law and the principle of non-refoulement is not always enforced. This generates 
liability by the EU concerning the returned asylum-seekers, owing to outsourcing 
responsibilities in refugee protection.182 In particular, problems arise relating to 
procedural and qualification problems for RSD such as late disclosure of SOGI 
in asylum claims, failed credibility assessments of sexual identities and 
misleading country of origin information concerning persecution due to SOGI.183 
These contribute to LGBTIQ asylum-seekers arriving from Turkey being regarded 
as being granted sufficient protection in Turkey, given its status as a SCO and 
STC. This happens despite the EP acknowledging that LGBTIQ asylum-seekers 
are particularly susceptible to gender-based violence,184 and that in countries 
deemed safe, they might still be “subjected to abuse, and thus have a legitimate 
request for protection.”185 
The Commission’s third report on the implementation of the Statement 
claims a reduction in attempts to cross the Aegean sea and in deaths at sea, 
confirming “the core strategy behind the decision of the EU and Turkey”.186 
Without wanting to delegitimise it, claims otherwise have also surfaced. 
Spijkerboer, argues that declining numbers in arrivals predate the Statement, and 
that, if it had any effect, it was the interruption of the decline observed. According 
to his research, the Statement does not seem to influence the already registered 
downward trend of daily arrivals and has no identifiable effect on border deaths, 
which can question the validity and efficacy of this policy. Moreover, the 
Statement came at a considerable cost for European values, having been 
                                               
180 The ECtHR held in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece that a state of destitution originated by the 
expulsion of an asylum-seeker translates into an obligation not to expel the individual. (Case of 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011: §365) 
181 Zieck, 2010. 
182 ECRE, 2016a. 
183 Chambel, 2016: 9-10. 
184 European Parliament, 2016b: C. 
185 id.: 12. 
186 European Commission, 2016c: 13. 
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concluded without the European Parliament’s (EP) consent and without allowing 
the Court of Justice (CJEU) to issue an opinion.187  
Additionally, the Commission’s lack of transparency has already been 
brought to court. After being contacted by Access Info, an NGO promoting the 
right of access to information in the EU, the Commission’s Legal Service refused 
to release information on the proceedings of the Statement, claiming, “protection 
of court proceedings and legal advice”, “protection of the decision making 
process” and “protection of the public interest as regards international 
relations”.188 The Commission’s DG HOME only authorised partial disclosure of 
documents owing to the same reasons.189 Consequently, a case brought by 
Access Info against the Commission is now pending at the CJEU, as are three 
other cases against the European Council concerning the EU-Turkey 
Statement.190 These cases’ existence does not necessarily reflect that illegalities 
have taken place, but it does signal contesting claims concerning a potential non-
compliance with EU legislation, which will, admittedly, have to be accessed by 
the CJEU itself. 
Summarily, there are considerable grounds to doubt the ethicality of this 
foreign policy deal in general and concerning sexual minorities in particular. If this 
deal has evidenced such shortcomings and questions the values of the EU, 
generating a moral and political tension, should it not be revised? Should the 
policy underlying it not be re-oriented towards a more ethical approach 
concerning sexual minorities? 
 
 
  
                                               
187 Spijkerboer, 2016. 
188 AskTheEU, 2016b. 
189 AskTheEU, 2016a. 
190 Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-257/16. 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION 
This paper set out to answer the following question: “How does a queer 
reading of the EU-Turkey Statement vis-à-vis LGBTIQ asylum-seekers contribute 
to empirical understandings of ‘Ethical Power Europe’?” Now, it is possible to 
devise a more concrete answer. 
The EU emerges after this analysis as an ethical and/or unethical player. 
Whereas there is consolidation of legislation towards the protection of LGBTIQ 
asylum-seekers, a rupture still materialised. Despite the claim that the enjoyment 
of one’s sexual identity is acknowledged in ‘European universal ethics’, 
particularly in asylum legislation, this was not recognised in the the Statement. 
Strikingly, despite SOGI not figuring in Turkish notions of universal ethics (or in 
the protection of minorities under Turkish legislation), the EU did not ensure that 
its own ethical stance concerning LGBTIQs materialised through a reformulation 
of the deal.  
Arguably, Turkey’s pursuit of a values-based foreign policy that projects 
itself as the ‘defender of the oppressed in the Middle East’ augments its normative 
power in the region,191 and its accommodation of refugees has been numerically 
remarkable. Despite this paper not seeking to assess the ethicality of Turkish 
policies, it can be claimed that, by recognising the principle of non-refoulement,192 
the 2014 Turkish ‘Law on Foreigners and International Protection’ envisions the 
protection of refugees, promoting its normative power in the region. Yet, Turkey 
does not grant RSD to the majority of these refugees (i.e. non-Europeans 
refugees), acting on a spirit of ‘generosity’ rather than granting rights. It offers 
them temporary protection and a ‘conditional refugee status’,193 but not refuge. 
Moreover, the alarming number of asylum-seekers entering the country also 
contributes to a lowering of the protections offered,194 which generates higher 
concerns vis-à-vis sexual minorities. Particularly, the absence of SOGI 
considerations in the ‘persons with special need’ section of the above-mentioned 
law195 is another indicator of Turkey’s attitude towards LGBTIQs, especially in 
                                               
191 Oktav & Çelikaksoy, 2015: 411-417. 
192 Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management, 2014: Article 4. 
193 id.: Article 62. 
194 Tolay, 2014: 4-6. 
195 Cf. Article 3(1)(l). 
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asylum. Despite the awareness of these situations, LGBTIQ asylum-
seekers/refugees continue to bear the repercussions. 
How do these reflections contribute to empirical understandings of EPE? 
Reflecting on Manners, one can see that the flaw incurred by the EU was on the 
domain of value ethics, ‘living by (consistent) example’ (sub-chapter 2.1), akin to 
what Chomsky claimed about consistency in universality (sub-chapter 3.1). The 
lack of consistency in the defence of SOGI in the Statement signified a 
shortcoming in its defence of SOGI in asylum (sub-chapter 3.2). The ‘space of 
rupture’ that ensued critically reflected Pin-Fat’s ‘(im)possible human rights’ and 
Donnelly’s ‘relative universality of human rights’ (sub-chapter 3.2), whereby the 
enjoyment of such rights is contextually conditional on the current situation. By 
signing a deal that did not fully acknowledge SOGI, where in fact these are 
specifically addressed in European Directives, the EC’s members acted as 
gatekeepers that affected the level of protection conferred upon sexual minorities 
‘on the move’. Here, Dunne’s account of a middle ground which possibly defaults 
from previous commitments was realised, by not encompassing the 
consequences that the deal creates for LGBTIQ asylum-seekers/refugees (sub-
chapter 2.1). Foucault’s domains of knowledge/power/pleasure are also 
inherently present, whereby the (re)production of ‘normal’ sexual identities is 
privileged, whereas ‘perverse’ ones are not only discouraged, but precluded 
(socially, legally and politically) in Turkey. The figurations that were evoked, as 
Haraway claims, mapped universes of knowledge and power, denouncing 
traditional notions concerning sexual identities. Accordingly, Butler’s ‘theory of 
performativity’ is exposed due to the lack of possibility to perform divergence, to 
identify as an ‘other’, owing to the inhibitions that tradition (as created by the AKP 
[Birdal]) imposes (sub-chapters 2.3 and 5.3). As exposed by Ashley, modernity 
emerges as an economy of power, and therefore creates a need for truth to 
emanate from a sovereign voice. In its post-modernising and current period 
(owing to the civilian opposition and to the 2016 putsch), Erdoğanist Turkey is 
ruled by the sovereign voice of the AKP, whose ‘paradigms of man’ (and women) 
are tools of power, seeking to normalise the population in the pursuit of the ‘public 
good’. In turn, these evidence Ashley’s ‘transversal struggles’ and the means by 
which they are waged (sub-chapter 2.3). Drawing on Pin-Fat again, one can 
deduce more clearly where “subjects are politically permitted as possible or 
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impossible: politically legitimate or illegitimate, […] masculine or feminine, normal 
or abnormal, desirable or undesirable […]”. Reading queerly the EU-Turkey 
Statement therefore provides an opportunity to understand where the enjoyment 
of sexual identity is verified/neglected in one particular instance of current 
European foreign policy. 
Owing to the EU’s ethics and the attitude displayed towards sexual 
minorities in Turkey, the former’s lack of their consideration is purposefully or 
negligently unethical. This does not necessarily mean that the EU generally acts 
unethically in foreign policy. Instead, reading queerly the EU as acting ethically 
and/or unethically (i.e. acting ethically or unethically, as well as ethically and 
unethically, considering the actors involved, the contexts, the conditions) 
highlights the very purpose of EPE scholarship: an increase in empirical agendas 
about the role of ethical agency. In so doing, it provides, as Aggestam suggested, 
not a statement of political reality, but research opportunities. Tellingly, this is not 
all that a queer reading provides. Reading the EU as acting ethically and/or 
unethically allows for a recognition of expectation-capability gaps (spaces of 
rupture), providing also opportunities for policy reorientation where the 
consideration of queer figures is (un)intentionally neglected/rejected, owing to the 
Union’s defended values. What policies ascribe to the ethics the EU purportedly 
defends? In what conditions have these ethics not been ‘concretised’ 
(Morgenthau) or ‘realised’ (Beitz)? Having identified those spaces of rupture, 
what factors are systematically and comparatively identified? And owing to 
Nunes’ claim that EPE puts the emphasis on the rights of individuals, do they 
map patterns of in/exclusion and patterns of representation? Addressing IR while 
deploying queer logoi of statecraft contributes to understanding how sexualities 
shape IR. This is done through the perception of queer rights as Westernised 
fabrications and through finding alternatives to deploy them while avoiding 
(neo)imperialist objections or through the realisation that, e.g. conditionality on 
foreign aid based on acceptance of diverse sexualities further fuels such 
criticisms.196 Concomitantly, deploying queer logoi contributes to realisations of 
how sexualities are shaped by IR, be it through the analysis of how traditionalism 
                                               
196 E.g. Weber argues that David Cameron’s policy of foreign aid conditionality on the basis of 
respect for LGBT rights served (neo)imperialist purposes for ‘modern states’ to become 
powerful enforcers of policy in ‘modernising states’. (Weber, 2016: 135) 
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effects figurations of the ‘sexually divergent’, how sexualised technologies of 
power (re)produce hetero- and cisnormativities or what progress needs to be 
made towards global queer rights. 
Indeed, what this queer and empirical account of EPE shows is that the 
EU, in this particular deal, acted unethically vis-à-vis sexual minorities, defaulting 
from previous commitments towards their protection. More fundamentally, this 
deal signifies an instance in which the capacity to live a dignified life while being 
LGBTIQ was traded-off for a position that did not fully align with the Union’s 
principles and human rights. Knowing that Turkey is an unsafe place for 
LGBTIQs, the EC signed a deal that neglected sexual minorities’ experiences 
and further endangered their already threatened lives, owing to being asylum-
seekers/refugees. It is however important to note that, despite this analysis’ focus 
on LGBTIQs, the deal affected many other asylum-seekers/refugees in unethical 
manners. Factually, despite disproportionately affecting LGBTIQs, the deal’s 
result was to create, like MEP Sophie in ‘t Veld claimed, a ‘fortress Europe’.197 
This analysis is not only important due to highlighting the shortcomings of 
this deal and exposing its flaws, but mostly because of the possibility it creates to 
reorient policy and, in so doing, ensuring that the EU acts in a more ethical way. 
Deploying EPE as an empirical research agenda, it is concluded here, can serve 
as a means to affect European foreign policy and ensure that the values the 
Union stands for are effectively observed in practice.  
The EU was, is and will continue to be a player that seeks to promote its 
ethical character both within and outside its boundaries. Nevertheless, if there is 
a benefit to theorising the EU as an EPE, that benefit is to expose where the 
commitment to being one fell short and what can be done in order to counter that 
reality. Particularly concerning sexuality politics and the acknowledgment of 
diverse sexual identities, queer readings in IR can provide critical analyses that 
seek to demonstrate what can be improved and how. 
 
  
                                               
197 European Parliament Intergroup on LGBTI Rights, in collaboration with ECRE and ILGA-
Europe, 2017. 
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